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NIETZSCHE IN LAW'S CATHEDRAL: BEYOND
REASON AND POSTMODERNISM
John Linarelli
Nietzsche had very little to say about law, and what he did say is
fragmentary and sporadic. Nietzsche's philosophy, however, offers a
basis for theorizing about law. This article uses Nietzsche's important
works to interpret two major movements in legal thought. The first part
of the article examines how Nietzsche's philosophy augments our
understanding of deontological theories about the law. Nietzsche
produced a substantial ethical theory. The second part of the article
examines how Nietzsche's philosophy helps us to understand law and
economics. Nietzsche had a great deal to say about the intellectual
predecessor to law and economics, utilitarianism, and his critique of
utilitarianism offers insights into law and economics and its intellectual
history. Further, Nietzsche elaborated a philosophy of science that
extends to and offers insights about "analytical" social sciences such as
economics.
INTRODUCTION
Nietzsche wrote almost nothing explicitly about law. Unlike Kant,
Hegel, and others, Nietzsche offered nothing like a philosophy of law.'
His limited asides setting forth explicit notions about law, if read without
further investigation, reflect an austere Austinian positivism, perhaps
reflecting the way law was conceptualized in nineteenth-century Europe,
when the great codifications of France and Germany were the subject of
Associate Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of Law. I am grateful to
Tad Beckman for his encouragement and for helping me to see the value of Nietzsche's
philosophy. I also wish to thank Jay Mootz and Jane Egly for helpful comments. Finally,
Christine Pente, a law student at La Verne, patiently waded through a draft and offered
insights. All references to works by Nietzsche are to section numbers in those works,
unless otherwise noted.
1. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT (W. Hastie
trans. 1887); GEORG W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T.M. Knox trans. 1967). It
would be wrong to assume that Kant's later work on philosophy of law was one of his
major contributions. For an overview of Kant's contribution to legal philosophy, see
EDWIN W. PATERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 376-403 (1953).
Although the title of the Patterson text is dated, the text nevertheless provides a good
basic overview.
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public intellectual discussion. In The Gay Science, Nietzsche conceives
law as a force against Dionysian impulses and the true mores of a
people.' In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche hints at law as being
necessary to protect against ressentiment.4 Nietzsche seems to say that
law is meant to protect people of nobility from the "herd" or those with
"reactive feelings.",5 Walter Kaufmann, the most influential interpreter
of Nietzsche's works, interprets Nietzsche to assume that "only the weak
need to rely on the rules of others," and "[m]an, being unique by nature,
should be able to generate his own standards, if only he were powerful
enough."6 In Nietzsche's writings there is an almost total absence of any
significant political philosophy.7 Nietzsche's philosophy, according to
Berkowitz, applies to individuals. It is about the "best life.",8 Nietzsche
was a moral philosopher, arguably one of the most significant ever.9
Although Nietzsche said almost nothing directly about law,
contemporary legal theorists and philosophers have labeled him a
pragmatist and a postmodernist' ° The discussion of Nietzsche in the
2. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS, First Essay
§§ 10-14 (Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale trans. 1967) [hereinafter GENEALOGY OF
MORALS].
3. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE § 43 (Walter Kaufmann trans. 1974)
[hereinafter GAY SCIENCE].
4. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, § 11.
5. Id.
6. WALTER KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST,
ANTICHRIST 250 (4th ed. 1974).
7. See PETER BERKOWITZ, NIETZSCHE: THE ETHICS OF AN IMMORALIST 1-2
(1995); cf. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 300-01
(1992). Walter Kaufmann did much to dispel the notion that Nietzsche's philosophy
supported Nazism. See KAUFMANN, supra note 6, at 284.
8. BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 4.
9. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 113 (2d ed. 1984). The author wrote:
For it was Nietzsche's historic achievement to understand more clearly than any
other philosopher-certainly more clearly than his counterparts in Anglo-Saxon
emotivism and continental existentialism-not only that what purported to be
appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of subjective will, but also the
nature of the problems that this posed for moral philosophy. It is true that
Nietzsche, as I shall later argue, illegitimately generalized from the condition of
moral judgment in his own day to the nature of morality as such: and I have
already said justifiably harsh words about Nietzsche's construction of that at
once absurd and dangerous fantasy, the Ubermensch. But it is worth noting how
even that construction began from a genuine insight.
Id.
10. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN & JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 53 (1984) (placing Nietzsche in the
discussion of critical legal studies and feminist jurisprudence and concluding that
Nietzsche's "perspective on values" is that values are "simply a product of power
relations" and that "there is no moral truth or objectivity and thus no point in taking
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legal literature is relatively scant, but still significant enough to be too
much to survey for this article, given its plan."
As for judicial use of Nietzsche, two curious references appear in the
opinions of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.'2 Scalia has used
Nietzsche to criticize the opinions of other Supreme Court Justices who
he believes depart from rules relating to stare decisis.3 In Harper v.
Virginia Department of Taxation, Scalia criticized a dissent Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor wrote, in which Justice O'Connor argued against
morality very seriously as a fundamental source of social (including legal) evaluation and
criticism"); DOUGLAS E. LITOWITZ, POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 42-64 (1997)
(describing Nietzsche as postmodernist).
11. Legal scholarship that deals with Nietzsche for its core discussion is sparse.
Another work using Nietzsche's philosophy to critique natural law is Postmodern
Philosophy and Law, by Douglas E. Litowitz. This Article differs substantially from
Litowitz's work. To mention a few differences: I do not classify Nietzsche as a
postmodernist, as does Litowitz. This Article focuses more narrowly on two natural law
theorists; Litowitz's book is a wider critique. This Article provides a critique of legal
consequentialism in Part 1I, which is absent from the Litowitz text.
In October 2001, the Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law held a
conference, Nietzsche and Legal Theory, resulting in a substantial addition to legal
literature on Nietzsche. The papers are published in Volume 24 of the Cardozo Law
Review. A sampling of those papers are included here, along with other sources. See, e.g.,
Jeanne L. Schroeder, Can Lawyers be Cured? Eternal Recurrence and the Lacanian Death
Drive, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 925 (2003); Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 967 (2003); Tatiana Flessas, Cultural
Property Defined, and Redefined as Nietzschean Aphorism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1067
(2003); Roger Berkowitz, Friedrich Nietzsche, the Code of Manu, and the Art of
Legislation, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 1131 (2003); Theresa Aiello, Nietzsche and Salomg
Laws of the Father: Sublimation, Narcissism and Idealization, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183
(2003); Adam Thurschwell, Specters of Nietzsche: Potential Futures for the Concept of the
Political in Agamben and Derrida, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 1193 (2003); Kyron Huigens,
Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 563 (2003); Wolfert von
Rahden, Individual Law: On Some Aspects of Nietzsche's Juridical and Aesthetic
Discourse, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 723 (2003); Jonathan Yovel, Gay Science as Law: An
Outline for a Nietzschean Jurisprudence, 24 CARDOzO L. REV. 635 (2003); Adam Gearey,
We Fearless Ones: Nietzsche and Critical Legal Studies, 11 L. & CRITIQUE 167 (2000);
Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism and Critique of History in Adjudication
and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 573 (2000); Richard H. Weisberg, It's a
Positivist, It's a Pragmatist, It's a Codifier! Reflections on Nietzsche and Stendhal, 18
CARDOzO L. REV. 85 (1996); Peter Berkowitz, On the Laws Governing Free Spirits and
Philosophers of the Future: A Response to Nonet's "What is Positive Law?", 100 YALE L.J.
701 (1990); Philippe Nonet, What is Positive Law?, 100 YALE L.J. 667 (1990); RICHARD H.
WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN
FICTION 14-25, 32-33 (1984).
12. See Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J.).
13. Harper, 509 U.S. at 102-10 (Scalia, J., concurring); Casey, 505 U.S. at 995-1001
(Scalia, J.).
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a retroactive application of a Supreme Court decision. 4 The majority
held that federal retirees living in Virginia could assert, in their state tax
refund claims, that a Supreme Court precedent applied retroactively.'5
The Supreme Court had changed the law on state taxation of federal
retirement benefits from a rule permitting taxation to one that did not.
6
In criticizing O'Connor for objecting to the retroactivity of precedent,
Scalia said:
That [the] original and enduring American perception of the
judicial role sprang not from the philosophy of Nietzsche but
from the jurisprudence of Blackstone, which viewed
retroactivity as an inherent characteristic of the judicial power,
a power "not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to
maintain and expound the old one.'
7
In a stinging dissent in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Scalia criticized the
majority for following the precedent of the famous Roe v. Wade, which
sets forth the parameters of when abortion is legal. 8 Scalia stated:
The Imperial Judiciary lives. It is instructive to compare this
Nietzschean vision of us unelected, life-tenured judges-leading
a Volk who will be "tested by following," and whose very
"belief in themselves" is mystically bound up in their
"understanding" of a Court that "speak[s] before all others for
their constitutional ideals"-with the somewhat more modest
role envisioned for these lawyers by the Founders.
"The judiciary ... has . . . no direction either of the strength or
of the wealth of the society, and can take no active resolution
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither Force nor Will,
"'19but merely judgment ....
Scalia's scant references could be said to misinterpret Nietzsche,
although, to be fair, Scalia was writing judicial opinions, not
philosophical essays.2 0
14. Harper, 509 U.S. at 102-10 (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)).
15. Id. at 89-90.
16. Id. at 98-99.
17. Id. at 107 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 69 (1765)).
18. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 995-96 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for following Roe v. Wade).
19. Id. at 996. The latter quotation is from The Federalist No. 78, pp. 393-94 (G. Wills
ed. 1982). The prior quotations are from the majority opinion.
20. See Mootz, supra note 11, at 1040. In the context of Supreme Court decisions that
have dealt with the legal status of gays and lesbians, Mootz contends that Scalia "offers
what might appear at first glance to be a Nietzschean critique, cutting through surface
[Vol. 53:413
Nietzsche in Law's Cathedral
This Article explores two themes using Nietzsche's philosophy, based
roughly on how legal theory divides between consequentialist and
deontological approaches.2 ' First, the Article examines how Nietzsche's
philosophy deals with legal policy issues that are expressed in
deontological terms.22 Here we must deal with the classic notions of
fairness, equality, justice and like concepts. Second, the Article explores
whether Nietzsche's philosophy has anything to say about the dominant
present day mode of legal thinking-law and economics-a variation of
utilitarianism.23 Law and economics is consequentialist to the core. I do
not contend that Nietzsche thought of law or anything else in a
consequentialist-deontological dichotomy. I use these categories
because of their relevance to contemporary legal theory.
The Article shows that Nietzsche's philosophy says a great deal about
contemporary legal ideas and also that Nietzsche offered insights about
24law that were far ahead of their time . The digestion of Nietzsche's ideas
by the legal scholars of his day was implausible. Yet his critiques of
science and reason had much to say about the scientism in the German
legal academy of his time, and about the method of juridical science that
pervades some German and continental European thinking about the
law. 25 A discussion of Nietzsche's philosophy and German codification,
however, is another article, one that centers on the philosophy of legal
history. This Article applies Nietzsche's philosophy to contemporary
Anglo-American legal thought.
I. NIETZSCHE AND DEONTOLOGICAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES
"No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature. ,
2
A.
Whether morality does or should influence the content of legal rules is
one of the more significant debates in jurisprudence. 2' Answers such as
appearances to the clash of political power that subtends the doctrinal squabbles," but
then concludes that Scalia does not offer Nietzschean or hermeneutical insights because he
pits power against reason in the form of politics against doctrinal legal analysis. Id.
21. For a fuller explanation of consequentialist versus deontological approaches, see
Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38-58 (2002).
22. See infra Parts I.A.-D.
23. See infra Parts II.A.-F. The view that law and economics is a variation on
utilitarianism is contentious and perhaps not well accepted. See infra text accompanying
notes 158-66.
24. See infra Part I.D.
25. See infra note 163. See generally Part II. This Article does not provide this
critique.
26. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF RELIANCE (1841).
2004]
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"law should reflect the mores of society" are as tautological as they are
certain to be uttered routinely in American law school classrooms.
Aligned with the problem of the law-morality connection, concepts
related to morality, such as fairness, justice, and equality, have an
uncertain location in the legal realm. 28  Nietzsche's moral philosophy
offers insights on these concepts.29 To explain how, this article compares
Nietzsche's philosophy to the writings of two of the more significant
natural law scholars of the late twentieth century, John Finnis and
Michael Moore. These two scholars were chosen because they represent
two of the more prominent voices in the contemporary natural law
tradition.0
In his most influential work, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Finnis
sets forth a theory of natural law.3' Finnis writes in the Aquinian
tradition.32 He uses the word "law" in the term "natural law" to mean
"any criteria of right judgment in matters of practice (conduct, or action),
any standards for assessing options for human conduct as good or bad,
right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, decent or unworthy.,
33
"Natural," according to Finnis, means that the criteria of right judgment
in law are "normative prior to any human choices." Such "prior
27. See generally BRIAN BIx, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 31-86 (3d
ed. 2004).
28. Economic analysis of law, widely perceived as the dominant school of legal
thought, sits squarely in opposition to justice or fairness-based approaches to the law. It
bypasses the difficulties in determining what is just or fair in favor of assessing the
efficiency properties of legal rules, and applying a dichotomous analysis of efficiency
versus distribution as a substitute for analysis of justice or fairness. See infra Part II for an
examination of economics of law as a species of utilitarianism. Because Nietzsche had
much to say about utilitarianism, the critique of law and economics is carved out for
special consideration in the next part.
29. See infra Part I.D.
30. I am grateful to Jay Mootz for pointing out that Lloyd Weinreb and LonFuller
offer other versions of natural law that can be more accommodating of Nietzschean
philosophy because their versions do not strictly require the discovery of timeless natural
law principles through reason. See Francis J. Mootz I1, Law in Flux: Philosophical
Hermeneutics, Legal Argumentation, and the Natural Law Tradition, 11 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 311, 313-14, 338-67 (1999). There are other natural law scholars that I omit from
the analysis as well.
31. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 1 (1980).
32. Though many examples could be given, see in particular JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY vii (1998) (commenting on the "fundamental
superiority" of Aquinas to Plato, Aristotle, and others); see also Patrick McKinley
Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J. L. & RELIGION 99 (characterizing Finnis as
"perhaps the best known expositor of Aquinas's legal ideas today").
33. John Finnis, Natural Law: The Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.
2002) [hereinafter OXFORD HANDBOOK].
34. Id.
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standards are not the product of either individual or collective choosing
or positing, and cannot be repealed, however much they may be violated,
defied, or ignored."35 To acknowledge these standards is to engage in
"practical reason," which is the capacity of a person to act in response to
36reasons for action.
Practical reason is one of the seven basic goods in Finnis's moral
theory: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practicable
reasonableness, and religion.3' Finnis views these basic goods as
"aspect[s] of authentic human flourishing,. . . real (intelligent) reason[s]
for action., 3 They exist as undoubted independent principles for their
own sake and not as means to other ends.39 They are based on the "acts
of practical understanding in which we grasp the basic values of human
existence and thus, too, the basic principles of all practical reasoning,,
40
which seems to be an elaborate way of saying that they are based on
human nature. From these basic goods, Finnis articulates nine "basic
requirements of practical reasonableness" which are needed to guide
humans to "discern moral reason in everyday life. ' 41 To Finnis, the basic
goods and the practicable principles are obvious, self-evident and
unquestionable.42
What about unreasonableness? To Finnis, unreasonableness is
"human, all too human." 43 It is "unnatural."" It is "a way of being less
than fully what a human person can be.",45 In addition:
Poor thinking and choosing not only fails to actualize to the full
one's capacities to be intelligent and reasonable, but also results
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. Steven J. Burton, Law as Practical Reason, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 747 (1989).
37. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 85-97.
38. Id. at 64; see Brian H. Bix, Natural Law: The Modern Tradition, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK, supra note 33, at 85.
39. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 64-65.
40. Id. at 59.
41. Id. at 100-26.
These nine principles are: [1] adopting a coherent plan of life; [2] having no
arbitrary preferences among values; [3] having no arbitrary preferences among
persons; [4] maintaining a detachment from the specific and limited projects one
undertakes; [5] not abandoning one's commitments lightly; [6] not wasting one's
opportunities by using inefficient methods; [7] not choosing to do something that
of itself does nothing but damage or impede the realization of or participation in
one or more of the basic goods; [8] fostering the common good of one's
community; [and] [9] acting in accordance with one's conscience.
Bix, supra note 38, at 86.
42. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 59.
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in actions or omissions which fail to respect and promote the
humanity, the nature, of everyone they affect. A community in
which the standards by which we identify such failure are
violated is not flourishing as it might. Its members, whether
they are those acting (and forbearing) or those who should have
been benefited not harmed, do not fulfill their capacities.
However typical of human affairs, such a condition is unnatural
so far as it is disrespectful of human persons. It is unnatural
because unreasonable, and unreasonable because neglectful of
the good of persons, the good which is the subject-matter of
practical reason's standards.46
Add to these principles the "master principle of morality," that humans
should act, choose, deliberate, and will only those possibilities which are
"compatible with integral human fulfillment," which means "the
fulfillment of all human beings and their communities, in all the basic
human goods., 47 From this master principle several other principles
arise, notably that one's motives should be rational and not involve
revenge, that one should follow the Golden Rule (do to others as you
would have them do to you), and do not do evil to further a good.48
Law fits into Finnis's theory as a system of practical reason embedded
in a particular social institution. 49 As a system of practical reason, law
can be understood only from an internal perspective, "the way of
thinking of someone who treats a rule as a reason for action." ' The
practical reason approach to law is to be contrasted with the approach of
those who examine law from an external perspective, who typically view
law "simply as a prediction or basis for prediction.""1 The external or
predictive approach is typically associated with such fields as law and
52economics and law and pragmatism.
Michael Moore is a moral realist." He believes that moral truth is
metaphysically real, and moral reality exists independent of our
language.4 The words used in law and in language generally refer to
objects that exist, and the existence of the objects is independent of any
46. Id. (emphasis in original).
47. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 28.
48. Id. at 29.
49. Id. at 3-18; see also JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 10-13 (rev.
ed. 1990).
50. FINNIS, supra note 31, at 27 (emphasis in original).
51. Id.
52. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAw 3-21 (distinguishing the
internal from external perspective).
53. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for
the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989).
54. Id. at 872.
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social construction or belief systems of the persons who use or hear those
words.5 Rights and duties, good and evil, are moral entities or "moral
kinds.,1 6 A moral kind is a moral theory that applies to a moral word,
such as justice or good, which is based not on human conventions but on
"the best theory we are able to articulate about what sort of quality...
[justice or good] really is."57 Moore is of the view that there are unique
and determinate right answers to moral questions. He considers legal
reasoning to be a species of moral reasoning. 9 In interpreting cases,
statutes, and constitutions, judges and lawyers should look for the real
nature of the things to which the words of the law refer)0 To get to the
right answers in morality and law, Moore articulates a nonfoundationalist
coherence theory of epistemology for determining a moral proposition,
which seems to dilute his moral reality: a moral value has to be coherent
with everything else we believe, in order to achieve the status of a moral
value. 1
B.
In classic Nietzsche fashion of avoiding a dichotomous way of
conceptualizing the world, Nietzsche's philosophy both condemns and
supports natural law. First, this Article sets forth the basic elements of
Nietzsche's condemnation. Second, this Article shows how Nietzsche
had a vision of the good that was ethically principled, although he used
the terms "noble" or "noble morality" rather than "good." Nietzsche's
concept of noble morality offers a reference point from which to make
ethical judgments about legal rules.
Natural law necessarily must rest on the foundation that there are
some a priori or metaphysically real principles that are true and
axiomatic, that do not require proof or justification, and that do not
require any human choices.62 These principles have value because they
are "right" or "moral," and all we need to do is find them.6' Nietzsche
55. See Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 277 (1985).
56. Michael Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIsC. L. REV. 1061, 1145 (1982).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1149.
59. Bix, supra note 38, at 91.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 90.
62. A casual review of Finnis's foundation text and the works of other natural law
scholars provides the insight. Cf. LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 97-
126 (1987) ("natural law without nature").
63. Finnis contends that self-evident basic goods, such as knowledge, exist. Finnis,
supra note 33, at 59. Moore contends that a metaphysical reality exists that is real and
knowable, independent of our interpretations of it. Moore, supra note 56, at 1149.
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would find a priori or metaphysically real principles problematic. In The
Gay Science, Nietzsche wrote:
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in
itself, according to its nature-nature is always value-less, but has
been given value at some time, as a present-and it was we who
gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world that
concerns man!4
Thus, to Nietzsche, values come into existence because of human
choice. Knowledge is the result of numerous errors made throughout
human history.5 Through time, some errors proved useful, others did
not.66 Those who were lucky enough to stumble upon the useful errors
survived, and in time their errors became wisdom. Says Nietzsche:
Such erroneous articles of faith, which were continually
inherited, until they became almost part of the basic
endowment of the species, include the following: that there are
enduring things; that there are equal things; that there are
things, substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be;
that our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in
itself.
68
Wisdom is not based on a priori truth, but rather on accident, the "dice
throw," illogic and error. 69 There is no compelling moral state of affairs.70
64. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 301 (emphasis in original). In his preface to On the
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explains "his a priori" as "the question of where our good
and evil really originated." GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Nietzsche's Preface,
§ 3.
65. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 110.
66. Id. §§ 110-11.
67. Id. § 110.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA: A BOOK FOR
ALL AND NONE, Third Part, § 4, "Before Sunrise" (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1995)
[hereinafter THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA]. Nietzsche wrote:
0 heaven over me, pure and high! That is what your purity is to me now, that
there is no eternal spider or spider web of reason; that you are to me a dance
floor for divine accidents, that you are to me a divine table for divine dice and
dice players.
Id.; see also GILLES DELEUZE, NIETZSCHE AND PHILOSOPHY 25-27 (Hugh Tomlinson
trans. 1983).
70. Though there are many sources for this point, Nietzsche's Preface in his On the
Geneology of Morals supports it nicely. Nietzsche explains that he is looking for the
"origin of moral prejudices." GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Nietzsche's
Preface, § 2. Later in the Preface, he explains:
Let us articulate this new demand: we need a critique of moral values, the value of
the values themselves must first be called into question .... One has taken the
value of these "values" as given, as factual, as beyond all question; one has
hitherto never doubted or hesitated in the slightest degree in supposing "the
[Vol. 53:413
Nietzsche in Law's Cathedral
Knowledge is not rational, scientific, ahistorical or analytical; rather,
knowledge is really interpretation that rises to the level of habit.
Humankind began to question error-produced wisdom only later in its
existence, and only in relatively recent times did the concept of "truth"
emerge, which Nietzsche calls the "weakest form of knowledge.",7' To
Nietzsche, "the strength of knowledge does not depend on its degree of
truth, but on its age, on the degree to which it has been incorporated, on
its character as a condition of life. 72
One Nietzschean problem of truth in natural law is that of false
71consciousness. In The Gay Science Nietzsche questions whether the so-
called realists "can forget your descent, your past, your training-all of
your humanity and animality" in order to engage in the cold and sober
analysis of reality.74 Realism is impossible because realists are burdened
with the primordial baggage that exists in all humans. They do not
understand how the world has its origins in the passions of former
centuries.75
Nietzsche would find Finnis's and Moore's emphasis on reason
problematic. Nietzsche would find them all too Socratic.76 To Nietzsche,
good man" to be of greater value than "the evil man," of greater value in the
sense of furthering the advancement and prosperity of man in general. But what
if the reverse were true?
Id. § 6. These sorts of statements are not to be misconstrued to suggest that evil villains
such as Saddam Hussein are somehow good. Rather, Nietzsche was raising very
sophisticated questions to challenge the moral philosophers of his day and of past ages.
71. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 110.
72. Id. (emphasis in original).
73. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines "false consciousness" as:
(1) lack of clean awareness of the source and significance of one's beliefs and
attitudes concerning society, religion, or values; (2) objectionable forms of
ignorance and false belief; (3) dishonest forms of self deception. Marxists (if not
Marx) use the expression to explain and condemn illusions generated by unfair
economic relationships .... Collingwood interprets false consciousness as self-
corrupting untruthfulness in disowning one's emotions and ideas.
THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY (Robert Audi, ed., 2d ed. 1999).
74. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 57.
75. Id.
76. Kaufmann contends that Nietzsche admired Socrates. In his famous book,
Kaufmann wrote an entire chapter on "Nietzsche's Attitude toward Socrates."
KAUFMANN, supra note 6, at 391-411. Even Kaufmann concedes, however, that Nietzsche
finds Socrates "deeply problematic." Walter Kaufmann, Translator's Introduction, in
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 12 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random
House 1967) (1872) [hereinafter BIRTH OF TRAGEDY]. Socrates was problematic for
Nietzsche because of Socrates' "faith" in reason. To Nietzsche, Socrates is in part
responsible for the death of tragic art. Nietzsche's main concern was with "aesthetic
Socratism," the "supreme law" of which is "to be beautiful everything must be
intelligible." Id.; see also ARTHUR C. DANTO, NIETZSCHE AS PHILOSOPHER 57-58 (1965).
Nietzsche disfavored Socratic emphasis on reason, at least as a basis for creating and
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Finnis's basic goods and requirements of practical reasonableness," and
Moore's moral reality, would turn life into something like a play by
Euripides.7 8  Nietzsche blames Euripides for the destruction of Greek
tragedy.79  To Nietzsche, the problem with Euripides was that he
abandoned the focus of Greek tragedy on the heroic in favor of
glorifying the affairs of the common man,"' producing plays that were
rational, comprehensible, and realistic in their portrayal of everyday life
and its imperfections." Nietzsche saw the death of tragedy in Euripides
because of the lack of Dionysian elements in Euripides' plays. "2 Moore
and Finnis represent the embodiment of the Apollonian approach, and
seek to remove the Dionysian element from the human state of affairs. 3
Finally, Nietzsche would find problematic the moral principles that
Finnis and Moore contend exist.84  Natural law fits nicely within
Nietzsche's conception of "slave morality. 85 Natural law is the belief
system of the "last man"-it is "human all too human." To Finnis, to be
unreasonable would be "human, all too human. 8 6 Nietzsche takes the
opposite view; to be reasonable is human, all too human. The reasonable
person is the "last man," someone satisfied with happiness, striving for
mediocrity and eraton. Nietzsche no doubt would refer to natural
law as "the brain-sick fancies of morbid cobweb spinners." Nietzsche is
by natural law standards immoral, but, as we shall see, he is nevertheless
ethically principled.
C.
To produce strident criticism of anything requires contrary positions,
and Nietzsche clearly had them. Despite his diatribes, his despising of
systematic knowledge, and his scathing ad hominem attacks, Nietzsche
experiencing art. Nietzsche admired Socratic accomplishment of focusing mankind on
reason, because the alternatives would lead to a worse state of affairs. Id. at 59.
77. See generally FINNIS, supra note 31.
78. BIRTH OF TRAGEDY, supra note 76, § 12; see also KAUFMANN, supra note 6, at
393.
79. DANTO, supra note 76, at 57.
80. BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 59.
81. Id.; DANTO, supra note 76, at 58.
82. DANTO, supra note 76, at 59.
83. See generally FINNIS, supra note 31.
84. See generally id.
85. One of the most fundamental tenets of Nietzsche's philosophy is the distinction
between slave and noble morality. See infra text accompanying notes 122-41, 168-72.
86. See FINNIS, supra note 31.
87. DANTO, supra note 76, at 197; BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 142-43.
88. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, Reason in Philosophy, in TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS § 4
(R.J. Hollingdale trans., Penguin Books 1968).
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constructed an ethical philosophy.9 He had an elaborate vision of the
truth and saw man as being able to choose, and choice as necessary for
being.9' Structuralism was not part of his philosophy, nor was
instrumentalism. Contrary to postmodern interpretations of his work,
Nietzsche was not a nihilist, though he did attack norms and standards by
which he saw nineteenth-century Europeans guiding their actions. 9'
Nietzsche did not reject value commitments, though his values differ
from what he calls the herd or slave morality of Christianity and
Enlightenment philosophy. 92 His elaborations on how the concept of
"good" began in primordial history reflecting the qualities of elites, then
to be rejected in the slave revolt in morality and the rise of ressentiment,
set forth an ethical agenda.93 Nietzsche's last man is to be contrasted with
his overman, who seeks not to dominate but to go beyond and to become
noble.94 The overman is not interested in hurting others; his nobility is
about transcending the human condition rather than concerning himself
with the lives of others.9
Nietzsche's works set forth an elaborate "noble mode of valuation" 96
and a noble morality that Russell and Kaufman find akin to the virtuous
life that Aristotle articulates in the Nicomachean Ethics.97 Nietzsche's
core philosophical conceptions are will to power, overcoming and eternal
recurrence.98 These conceptions are ethical principles that mandate value
commitments. Heidegger viewed Nietzsche as one of the most important
metaphysical thinkers in Western philosophy.9 He also is one of the
most important moral philosophers in Western philosophy.""' Here, this
Article examines the affirmative side of Nietzsche's philosophy.
Will to power is the struggle of humans over time to learn and develop
norms of behavior through species preserving error.'O' It is both creative
and destructive."" It creates because humans use will to power to
89. See generally GENEAOLOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 141-44.
93. See GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, First Essay, § 10.
94. DANTO, supra note 76, at 197.
95. Id.
96. GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, First Essay, § 10.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 130-42.
98. Tad Beckman, Notes for Nietzsche, at http://www.4hmc.edu:8001/
humanities/beckman/nietzsche/reading/also.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
99. 2 MARTIN HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE 1 (David Farrell Krell trans., Harper & Row
1984) (1954).
100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
101. Beckman, supra note 98.
102. Id.
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produce values and to make sense of existence.' 3 It destroys because it
must overcome old values that no longer serve us.' °4 Nietzschean will to
power differs fundamentally from natural law philosophy because the
world is chaotic and we cannot understand it through reason. 5 There is
no right reason or moral reality that we must ultimately discover if we
think or try hard enough.' °6 Heidegger interprets Nietzsche's will to
power as designating the basic character of being; it is the basic question
of the being of beings.' 7
Will to power is a mode of valuation, a method, but not value itself.'08
It does not tell us what is right and wrong, ideas that are uncomfortable
in Nietzschean philosophy because they presuppose that values can be
sufficiently general or "right. ' '°9 To Heidegger, will to power has to be
thought of together with Nietzsche's eternal recurrence in order to fully
grasp Nietzsche's philosophy." °  Using Heidegger's conception of
Nietzsche's philosophy, we now can see the conceptual glue being set on
Nietzsche's ethics."' When will to power and eternal recurrence are read
together, they give us a way of being or operating as does Finnis's
practical reasonableness.'
2
Heidegger contended that the idea of the eternal recurrence was the
fundamental thought in Nietzsche's philosophy." 3 Although Nietzsche
explained it allegorically in Thus Spoke Zarathustra,"4 he described
eternal recurrence succinctly in Ecce Homo as "the unconditional and
infinitely repeated circular course of all things.""..5 Though Nietzsche for




106. Id. Will to power is the fundamental human ability to struggle through the
incomprehensible accident of the world to make life sensible and practical.
107. 1 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99, at 18-21.
108. THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 69, Second Part; Tad Beckman, Notes
on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, at http://www4.hmc.edu:8001/humanities/beckman/
nietzsche/reading/Also.html.
109. 1 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 18.
112. See generally Notes for Nietzsche, supra note 98; FINNIS, supra note 31. Both sets
of principles have to do with how to live life.
113. 2 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99, at 5. Nietzsche called his idea of the eternal
recurrence a "doctrine."
114. THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 69, Third Part, "On the Vision and the
Riddle."
115. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ECCE HOMO, Essay on Birth of Tragedy, § 3 (Walter
Kaufmann trans. 1966) [hereinafter ECCE HOMO].
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law," 6 he ultimately settled for leaving it as an ethical precept, about a
way of life.' 7 Because what we do eternally returns, every moment
counts." 8 Eternal recurrence gives direction to will to power. " 9 We now
must promote the highest order of values possible, because what we do
now will return in the future.""
Finally, Nietzsche specified a set of values for humans to seek to
achieve through will to power. He does not see the essence of life in self
preservation, but in enhancement of life.' Nietzsche was not a moral
skeptic.'2 Humans must overcome; the goal is becoming overman, not to
model one after a saint or God. 123 Noble values are embodied in the idea
of a noble morality, which is to be contrasted with slave or herd
morality. 24 The noble moral person is one who has a strong character, a
"great souled" character in the style of the Athenian citizen.' 2 The noble
moral person triumphs over ressentiment. To avoid ressentiment is an
ethical precept.126 To be kind, humble or silent when one is too weak or
timid to act, to be humble when one cannot bear unpleasant
repercussions, to make virtue of necessity, to want revenge against the
teacher, to have reactive feelings, to be resentful, and to seek and give
pity, Nietzsche identified these as attributes of slave morality.27  To
quote Nietzsche, through his Zarathustra:
But if you have an enemy, do not requite him evil with good, for
that would put him to shame. Rather prove that he did you
some good.
And rather be angry than put to shame. And if you are cursed, I
do not like it that you want to bless. Rather join a little in the
cursing.
116. 2 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99, at 106-09.
117. 2 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99, at 122-23.
118. Beckman, supra note 108.
119. See 3 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99.
120. Beckman, supra note 108.
121. 3 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99, at 15.
122. This is perhaps one of the central themes in BERKOWITZ, supra note 7.
123. DANTO, supra note 76, at 196-97.
124. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, § 10.
125. See infra text accompanying notes 131-39.
126. See 3 HEIDEGGER, supra note 99. In essence, it means that one should be strong
and magnanimous.
127. KAUFMANN, supra note 6, at 371-72.
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And if you have been done a great wrong, then quickly add five
little ones: a gruesome sight is a person single-mindedly
obsessed by a wrong.
Did you already know this? A wrong shared is half right. And
he who is able to bear it should take the wrong upon himself.
A little revenge is more human than no revenge. And if
punishment is not also a right and an honor for the transgressor,
then I do not like your punishments either.
It is nobler to declare oneself wrong than to insist on being
right-especially when one is right. Only one must be rich
enough for that.
I do not like your cold justice; and out of the eyes of your judges
there always looks the executioner and his cold steel. Tell me,
where is that justice which is love with open eyes? Would that
you might invent for me the love that bears not only all
punishment but also all guilt! Would that you might invent for
me the justice that acquits everyone, except him that judges!
Do you still want to hear this too? In him who would be just
through and through even lies become kindness to others. But
how could I think of being just through and through? How can
I give each his own? Let this be sufficient for me: I give each
128my own.
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche says:
While the noble man lives in trust and openness with himself
(gennaios "of noble descent" underlines the nuance "upright"
and probably also "naive"), the man of ressentiment is neither
upright nor naive nor honest and straightforward with himself.
His soul squints; his spirit loves hiding places, secret paths and
back doors, everything covert entices him as his world, his
world, his security, his refreshment; he understands how to keep
silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally
self-deprecating and humble. A race of such men of
ressentiment is bound to become eventually cleverer than any
128. THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 69, First Part, "On the Adder's Bite"
68-69.
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noble race; it will also honor cleverness to a far greater degree:
namely, as a condition of existence of the first importance ....
To be incapable of taking one's enemies, one's accidents, even
one's misdeeds seriously for very long-that is the sign of
strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to
form, to mold, to recuperate and to forget .. . . Such a man
shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into
others; here alone genuine "love of one's enemies" is possible-
supposing it to be possible at all on earth. How much reverence
has a noble man for his enemies! -and such reverence is a
129
bridge to love.
Such ideas permeate Nietzsche's works; the above extracts capture the
essential concepts.
Russell and Kaufmann compare Nietzsche's concept of the noble man
to Aristotle's great souled or magnanimous man found in Book IV of
Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.3 Aristotle refers to "greatness of soul,"
an upper class Greek virtue that has no direct translation into present
day English, but which is close to magnanimity, proper pride or self-
respect."' The great souled or magnanimous man "thinks that he is
worthy of great things, provided that he is worthy of them.', 32 "The man
who is worthy of little consideration and thinks that he is such is
temperate [moderate], but not magnanimous, because magnanimity
implies greatness .... ,,3 Aristotle identifies a number of characteristics
129. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, First Essay, § 10 (emphasis in original).
130. Kaufmann, supra note 6, at 382-83; BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF
WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 176 (1945).
131. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 153 (J. A.K. Thomson trans. 1933)
(Translator Notes). The word in ancient Greek is megalopsuchia. Though Thomson
translates this word to mean magnamity, Rackham says that it means "lofty pride and self-
esteem rather than magnamity or high-mindedness (in the modern sense of the word)."
Compare id., with ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 213 n.b (H. Rackham trans.,
1933).
132. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Thomson trans.), supra note 131, at
§ 1123a31-b13.
133. Id. Aristotle continues:
The man who thinks that he is worthy of great things although he is not worthy
of them is conceited; but not everybody is conceited who has too high an opinion
of his own worth. On the other hand the man who has too low an opinion is
pusillanimous: and it makes no difference whether his worth is great or moderate
or little, if his opinion of it is too low. Indeed the man whose worth is great
might be regarded as especially pusillanimous, because what would his behaviour
be if his worth were not so great?
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of the great souled or magnanimous man in his Book IV.14  Of
Aristotle's magnanimous man, Russell remarked, "One shudders to
think what a vain man would be like.' ' 35  The connection between
Aristotle's and Nietzsche's ethics seem clear. 116 Nietzsche, like Aristotle,is not concerned with how to make people "good" or "moral," but rather
134. Id. §§ 1124a23-b14 to 1125a5-27.
The magnanimous man does not take petty risks, nor does he court danger,
because there are few things that he values highly; but he takes great risks, and
when he faces danger he is unsparing of his life, because to him there are some
circumstances in which it is not worth living. He is disposed to confer benefits,
but is ashamed to accept them, because the one is the act of a superior and the
other that of an inferior. When he repays a service he does so with interest,
because in this way the original benefactor will become his debtor and
beneficiary. People of this kind are thought to remember the benefits that they
have conferred, but not those that they have received (because the beneficiary is
inferior to the benefactor, and the magnanimous man wants to be superior), and
to enjoy being reminded of the former, but not of the latter .... Another mark
of the magnanimous man is that he never, or only reluctantly, makes a request,
whereas he is eager to help others. He is haughty towards those who are
influential and successful, but moderate towards those who have an intermediate
position in society, because in the former case to be superior is difficult and
impressive, but in the latter it is easy; and to create an impression at the expense
of the former is not ill-bred, but to do so among the humble is vulgar-like using
one's strength against the weak .... He is bound to be open in his likes and
dislikes (because concealment, i.e. caring less for the truth than for what people
think, is a mark of timidity), and to speak and act straightforwardly (his superior
attitude makes him outspoken and candid ... ); and he cannot bear to live in
dependence upon somebody else, except a friend, because such conduct is
servile; which is why all flatterers are of the lowest class, and humble people are
flatterers. He is not prone to express admiration, because nothing is great in his
eyes. He does not nurse resentment, because it is beneath a magnanimous man
to remember things against people, especially wrongs; it is more like him to
overlook them. He does not care for personal conversation; he will talk neither
about himself nor about anyone else, because he does not care to be
complimented himself or to hear others criticized; nor again is he inclined to pay
compliments. For this reason he is not abusive either, not even of his enemies,
unless he intends to be insulting. In troubles that are unavoidable or of minor
importance he is the last person to complain or ask for help, because such an
attitude would imply that he took them seriously.
Id.
135. RUSSELL, supra note 130.
136. I am not the first, and probably not the last, to see this. See id. at 175. In After
Virtue, Maclntyre argues that the moral philosophies of Nietzsche and Aristotle present
"two genuine theoretical alternatives confronting anyone trying to analyze the moral
condition of our culture." Maclntyre, supra note 9, at 110. Maclntyre contends that to
Nietzsche, modern moral utterance is specific to the person, not determined by reason but
by will. In the end, Maclntrye rejects Nietzsche. His logic: The Enlightenment
philosophers tried to repudiate Aristotle, but they failed. Nietzsche tried to repudiate the
Enlightenment philosophers, which needed to be done because the Enlightenment was a
failure. So, our only alternatives are Nietzsche or Aristotle, and certainly we cannot
accept Nietzsche. Id. at 109-20 (chapter entitled "Nietzsche or Aristotle?").
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with how one is to be a successful human being.137 Aristotle's virtuous
person was not a Christian saint, nor was Nietzsche's. 3 '
Finally, Nietzsche had no concern about the common good.
Nietzsche's herd or slave morality is good for the group or collective but
not for the individual; noble morality is about how to make the individual
better off, regardless of what the community might need from the
individual.'9 But is Nietzsche in this respect so different from any other
nonconsequentialist philosopher? Aristotle, clearly not utilitarian,
examines the virtues of the good person from the standpoint of the
person who has, or lacks, the virtue, and is not concerned with the effects
of the virtue on other persons. His discussions of generosity or courage
in Nichomachean Ethics, for example, consider these virtues only from
the perspective of the agent possessing these qualities and not from the
perspective of how these qualities are necessary to protect society.1
4
0
Aristotle's concept of the common good is fused with his concept of




What do Nietzsche's ethics say about law? If natural law is slave or
herd morality, and if we accept that natural law is or should inform the
content of positive law, then we must conclude that positive law is or
should be based on herd morality. Law is meant primarily for society
and can harm persons striving for a noble morality. Nietzsche would ask
us to develop a new jurisprudence that preserves freedom to overcome,
to pursue noble morality. 42 Positive law can be constructed in such a way
because Nietzsche viewed norms embodied in morals and law as social
constructions. 43 Nietzsche would prefer a legal system that disables and
avoids ressentiment, that would promote human freedom in a pluralist
setting without interpersonal comparisons.'" Nietzsche's normative
vision is that we should fundamentally reevaluate law and other social
systems and reorient towards a noble morality.
137. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 131, Translator's Introduction, at 29.
138. RUSSELL, supra note 130, at 175.
139. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, § 2.
140. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Thomson trans.), supra note 131, at 31.
This is implicit in Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia. See J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle on
Eudaimonia, in ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS: CRITICAL ESSAYS (Nancy Sherman ed., 1999).
141. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Thomson trans.), supra note 131, §
1094a22-b12; MacIntyre, supra note 9, at 150.
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Nietzsche's discussion of the notion of equality provides an example of
how we can use Nietzsche's legal theory to inquire about law. In several
passages, Nietzsche expressed disfavor with the notion of equality.
45
Nietzsche's thoughts on equality are important because the notion of
formal equality and how to implement it pervades the ideal visions of
Western legal systems. A fundamental aspect of the human condition
that law seeks to address is which sorts of inequality deserve legal
redress. Hence, constitutional law mandating equal protection and due
process, statutes prohibiting discrimination and cases interpreting these
statutes, and the recent affirmative action cases are but examples of the
ongoing dialogue between law and society on what sorts of inequalities
are permissible and which are not. 146
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in a section entitled "On the Tarantulas,"
Nietzsche metaphorically describes "preachers of equality" as tarantulas





Nietzsche's main concern seems to be about dictatorial preferences:
"You preachers of equality, the tyrannomania of impotence clamors thus
out of you for equality: your most secret ambitions to be tyrants thus
shroud themselves in words of virtue. ,148 "I do not wish to be mixed up
and confused with these preachers of equality. For to me justice speaks
thus: 'Men are not equal.' Nor shall they become equal! What would my
love of the overman be if I spoke otherwise?'
149
These passages are easily misconstrued to suggest that Nietzsche was
anti-liberal or racist.10 Nietzsche's conception of will to power does not
mean that the strong should subjugate the weak or that there are
inherent inequalities among peoples. Nietzsche saw values and the
characteristics of humans as socially constructed, so it is difficult to read
determinism into his philosophy. Rather, Nietzsche's concern with
equality is twofold: first, the striving for equality is a search for the
unattainable. People are different and can choose. Some will seek a
noble life while others will practice ressentiment and bad conscience. 5' If
145. See BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL §§ 201-03, 212, 238; THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA,
supra note 69, at 99-100.
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
147. THUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 69, Second Part, "On the Tarantulas" at
99 (emphasis in original).
148. Id. at 100.
149. Id. (emphasis in original).
150. There are other more obvious and regrettable racist and sexist passages in
Nietzsche's works. The problem with many Nietzsche interpretations, however, is
selective misquoting. Nietzsche advised against this. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra
note 2, Nietzsche's Preface, § 8, n.5.
151. See id. § 10 n.2.
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people are free they will make choices about which path to take. Second,
in response to the democratic consolidation that started to take hold in
Europe in the nineteenth century, Nietzsche is essentially asking the
question "is that all there is?" To Nietzsche, equality works much like
Christianity, to sap the life out of people, to make them comfortable,
complacent, and to furnish incentives to compare their lot with others,
even if their state of affairs is dismal, rather than to strive for a higher
order on their own, without reference to what others have or do not
have.1 2 In sum, to Nietzsche, equality is overrated.
But Nietzsche's criticism of equality is vague. His objection could be
read as against egalitarianism, an idea important in nineteenth-century
European socialist thought. It is doubtful that Nietzsche would have
much interest in the minimum fairness standard of treating like cases
alike, though if he were to have an interest, it is unlikely that he would
strenuously object.' Treating like cases alike does not impose the
requirement that everyone must be the same; it only says that everyone
must be treated the same if they are the same.5 4 Nietzsche does not
"solve" the question how to determine which value should be permitted
and which should not. Rather, his answer would be that this is all well
and good, but that such interpersonal comparisons are largely beside the
152. Nietzsche expresses such criticisms of Christianity throughout his works. Though
clearly not one of his better works, perhaps his culminating work stating his views on
Christianity is FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE ANTI-CHRIST (R.J. Hollingdale trans. 1968).
He soon went mad after writing THE ANTI-CHRIST. Id. at 7. For a balanced treatment,
see BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 77-83.
153. For a discussion of the standard of treating like cases alike, see David A. Strauss,
Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike?, University of Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory
Working Paper No. 24, (May 8, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
delivery.cfm/SSRNID312180_code020518530.pdf?abstractid=312180; JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 237-78 (1971).
154. Joseph Raz argues that the treating like cases alike principle is tautological and
impossible to attain. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 226-27 (1979). I disagree. Consider the following syllogism, inspired by
Joseph Raz:
Being or not being Chinese is irrelevant to one's eligibility to enroll in college.
Jane is Chinese.
Therefore, Jane's race is irrelevant to her eligibility to enroll in college.
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 217-44 (1986). What is "same" or "alike" is
the subject of volumes of law on permissible and impermissible categories of difference.
For example, to discriminate against entry to university on the basis of race is
impermissible because it treats applicants differently, on the basis of an impermissible
category. Race discrimination produces impermissible inequality. It fails to treat like
cases alike, because race is not a legitimate difference. But to discriminate against entry to
a university on the basis of SAT scores is permissible because it treats applicants
differently on the basis of a permissible category: success on a standardized test.
Discrimination on the basis of standardized test scores produces equality; it treats like
cases alike.
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point of a commitment to the noble life. Nietzsche would have no need
for fairness or equality other than to facilitate will to power.
Thus, law to Nietzsche should be committed to freedom to engage in
will to power. Nietzsche might have the need for law that frees
individuals so that they may pursue noble morality. Given the eternal
return of the same, we need to "get law right." Nietzsche explains the
purpose of law in On the Genealogy of Morals:
Finally, one only has to look at history: in which sphere has the
entire administration of law hitherto been at home-also the
need for law? In the sphere of reactive men, perhaps? By no
means: rather in that of the active, strong, spontaneous,
aggressive. From a historical point of view, law represents on
earth . . . the struggle against the reactive feelings, the war
conducted against them on the part of the active aggressive
powers who employed some of their strength to impose
measure and bounds upon the excesses of the reactive pathos
and to compel it to come to terms. Wherever justice is
practiced and maintained one sees a stronger power seeking a
means of putting an end to the senseless raging of ressentiment
among the weaker powers that stand under it.15
Written before the introduction of the modern welfare state, Nietzsche's
words sound illiberal, even repugnant, to contemporary ears. Nietzsche
could be interpreted as rejecting what we call today "social justice"
because it manifests ressentiment.156 In such an interpretation, Nietzsche
forms a classical vision of the rule of law, in the sense that law should
promote human freedom, to stop or deter one person or a group of
persons from imposing their morality upon others, to prohibit or reduce
arbitrary activities that would permit one person from preying on
another.
A contrasting interpretation would not place Nietzsche in a political
context. Some may be tempted to label Nietzsche "conservative" or
"liberal," "right wing" or "left wing." We must avoid trying to
pigeonhole Nietzsche into the politics of the present. Nietzsche would
have no patience with such political concepts, seeing them as last man
thinking, full of bad conscience. Nietzsche's philosophy asks us to
transcend politics. To transcend politics we must imagine a world in
which social justice is compatible with Nietzsche's noble morality, as a
way of improving the human condition.
155. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, § 11.
156. BERKOWITZ, supra note 7, at 86.
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II. NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL UTILITARIANISM
Utilitarians "are right so rarely that it is really pitiful. "1,
A.
Nietzsche's assault on the utilitarians, those "English psychologists,"'1
58
bears particular relevance for critiquing law and economics, currently the
dominant research agenda in the legal academy. 5 9 This part of the article
applies Nietzsche's critiques of utilitarianism and science to law and
economics. Nietzsche's complaints about utilitarianism shed light on the
scope and force of economic analysis of law. Nietzsche's critique of
science proves relevant because law and economics apply "analytical" or
"rigorous" social science methods of economics to law.' Economics
follows very much the scientific tradition of Popperian hypothesis
testing.16 1 It relies on a rigid distinction between normative and positive
analysis. It seeks to "explain," "make findings," and "predict" the
consequences or effects of legal rules and processes. 162  In law and
economics, we have seen some of the most dramatic examples of
scientific analysis of law in the post-realist period. Law and economics
differs from nineteenth century approaches to legal science, in that law
and economics applies economic science to law. As a result, law is not an
"autonomous discipline" in this approach, as it was in the other, older
and now discredited scientific approach to law. 63 Hence, a substantial
157. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 84.
158. GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, First Essay, § 1.
159. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Trends in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical
Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, The Cathedral
at Twenty-Five: Citations and Impressions, 106 YALE L.J. 2121 (1997); William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, Heavily Cited Articles in Law, 71 CHI. KENT L. REV. 825 (1996).
160. See Charles K. Rowley, Social Sciences and the Law: The Relevance of Economic
Theories, 1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1981); ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 10-13 (Robert
H. Bates et al. eds., 1998) (explaining differences between analytical tools of economics
and narrative tools of history); KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK,
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 5-8 (1997)
(analytical methods in politics); MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER,
ANALYTICAL POLITICS 3-9 (1997) (analytical methods in politics); see generally JON
ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1989); MARTIN HOLLIS, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1994).
161. See Rowley, supra note 160.
162. See supra note 160.
163. See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-
1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
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interdisciplinary movement prevails in legal scholarship, and law and
economics is an integral part of that movement. T6
Legal scholars have disagreed on whether law and economics is
utilitarian.15  I do not engage this dispute in any appreciable level of
sophistication here, although the similarities and intellectual connections
seem substantial. Rather, I contend that what Nietzsche said about
utilitarianism and science furthers our understanding of the
jurisprudential niche of law and economics, regardless of whether law
and economics is utilitarian. This part of the article dissects what
Nietzsche said about utilitarianism, to expose the main tenets relevant to
economics, and to show that Nietzsche produced a serious critique that
must be inquired into and that must not be overshadowed by the
sometimes harsh and regrettable attacks that Nietzsche visited upon
utilitarians and "Englishmen.' 66
B.
Nietzsche starts On The Genealogy of Morals with an attack on
utilitarianism.57 To Nietzsche, what is good (or, in economic terms, "a
good") has nothing to do with utility. Nietzsche looks to the origins of
the good in noble morality.' Noble morality is internal to the individual
and has nothing to do with instrumental effects on others. In dealing
with his famous distinction between herd or slave morality and noble
morality, Nietzsche used the word "utility" to describe the usefulness of
herd morality to the preservation of the herd. 69 Egoism is a herd or slave
morality concept. 70 People responding to external incentives in order to
maximize utility or welfare engage in herd or slave morality. 7 '
Utilitarianism in this sense is like religion; religious morality also comes
from the outside, but it is revealed in sacred texts. Evolution suffers
164. See supra note 160; see also NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVE G. MEDEMA,
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM POSNER TO POSTMODERNISM (1998).
165. See JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 95-132 (1998); Richard
A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979);
H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977).
166. For example, in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche is ad hominem in his criticism.
He refers to the "English-mechanistic doltification of the world" and "mediocre minds."
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL: PRELUDE TO A PHILOSOPHY OF THE
FUTURE §§ 252-253 (Walter Kaufmann trans., 1966) [hereinafter BEYOND GOOD AND
EVIL].
167. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, §§ 1-3.
168. See supra notes 96-98, 130-41 and accompanying text.
169. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, § 201.
170. Id. § 261.
171. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 116.
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from the same defects; it denies the possibility of noble morality because
character is determined by genes, an external force. Nietzsche
conceptualized the powerful ideas of his day something like this:
Slave Systems Sources of Normativity
Utilitarianism Pleasure-Pain Principle/Utils
Religion Revelation and Ressentiment
Evolutionary Biology Genes (External Factor)
Utilitarianism relies on goods and evils, pains and pleasures, in order
to sum up the satisfactions of individuals, or to find the greatest good for
the greatest number. '  In economics, the analogous concepts are
"preference" and utility maximization. 73 Nietzsche throws into question
the entire utilitarian project. He could not accept utilitarianism because
he rejected the idea that good and evil differ, or at least it could be said
that he rejected any simple contrasts or opposing formulas for good and
evil.' 74 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche claims that "the strongest and most
evil spirits have so far done the most to advance humanity. ' Nietzsche
believed the abolition of suffering to be undesirable, and that "we would
rather have it higher and worse than ever.' ' 76 To Nietzsche, only the
discipline of suffering has brought about improvements in humankind.
7
Nietzsche finds utilitarianism as "altogether an impossible literature,
unless one knows how to flavor it with some malice.'
78
It would be a serious misinterpretation to read Nietzsche to mean that
he wanted people to suffer or to be evil. To Nietzsche, evil is a concept
humans define in society and convention, which has a purpose to
improve the human condition. 79 Too much order in society "puts the
passions to sleep."' 80  Evil reawakens "the sense of comparison, of
contradiction, of the pleasure in what is new, daring, untried; they
compelled men to pit opinion against opinion, model against model."' 8'
172. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, § 260.
173. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 18-37 (1990).
174. See supra notes 179-86 and accompanying text.
175. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 4.
176. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, § 225.
177. Id.
178. Id. § 228 (emphasis in original).
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Nietzsche continues, that what is new is always evil because it "wants to
conquer and overthrow the old boundary markers and the old pieties." '82
To Nietzsche, "only what is old is good.', 8 3 In this way, Nietzsche
critiques the simple good-evil or pain-pleasure dichotomy that
utilitarians propose. "[E]vil instincts are expedient, species-preserving,
and indispensable to as high a degree as the good ones; their function is
merely different. '' &l Nietzsche is saying something similar to George
Bernard Shaw's "[tihe reasonable man adapts himself to the world: the
unreasonable one persists in trying to adapt the world to himself.
Therefore all progress depends on the unreasonable man."'85  To
Nietzsche, hardship, striving, unreasonableness-these are all attributes
that are required for the enhancement of the human condition.
86
Nietzsche did not value happiness or welfare; these are not the big
issues to Nietzsche. Rather, to Nietzsche, focusing on these values stops
people from realizing their full potential. 7  Nietzsche criticized
utilitarianism as concerned with trivial matters.'88  To Nietzsche,
measurements of human welfare that utilitarianism uses fail to address
important problems; "there are higher problems than all problems of
pleasure, pain, and pity; and every philosophy that stops with them is a
naivet6.' 8 9 Pain and pleasure are "mere epiphenomena and wholly
secondary."' 9 Well-being or welfare-maximization are states that make
humankind "ridiculous and contemptible."' 19'
C.
Law and economics assumes that people are rational, which means
that people act in their own self-interest to maximize their own




185. GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAN AND SUPERMAN: A COMEDY AND A
PHILOSOPHY 238 (1903).
186. Nietzsche's complaints about equality apply here too. See supra notes 146-57 and
accompanying text.





192. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN
BEHAVIOR 3-14 (1976).
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question.' 93 Using the idea of "bounded rationality," economists model
the effects of uncertainty and imperfect information on human choice. 
1 94
Some of these economic models accept that people "satisfice," meaning
that they "follow[] ordinary habits and rules of thumb so long as they
yield satisfactory results, even if an alternate set of procedures would in
theory be superior. '
The model of bounded rationality and "satisficing" finds some support
from Nietzsche; he would accept that knowledge is not rational,
scientific, ahistorical or analytical.' 96  Likewise, to Nietzsche, logic
originates in illogic.'97 "Innumerable beings who made inferences in a
way different from ours perished; for all that, their ways might have been
truer."' 9 Those who were too deliberate and cautious, not finding things
to be equal, perished. Those who survived considered two circumstances
equal when there is nothing logical in equality because nothing is equal.' 99
Nietzsche's basic point is consistent with behavioral economics, in its
claim that logic is not solely or even primarily about rational calculation,
but about "satisficing" or rule of thumb thinking about the world, in
which error educates2 °
Nietzsche, however, is dissatisfied with error-produced understanding.
To Nietzsche, knowledge stems from a clash between the "impulse for
truth" and "life-preserving errors."' ' Nietzsche would prefer that people
get out of their error-produced ruts; this is where his normative ethics
come in, his will to power and eternal recurrence, which calls upon
individuals to enhance their condition beyond traditional.
202understanding.
193. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 3-7 (Cass
R. Sunstein, ed., 2000).
194. FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 267-69 (Avery Wiener
Katz, ed., 1998) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
195. Id. at 268.
196. See GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 110.
197. Id. § 111.
198. Id. Nietzsche offers as an example that one could be too deliberate in deciding
whether a tiger is dangerous as compared to a snake. Those who exercised lower levels of
logical power would consider the element of "danger" to be equal here, while the more
deliberate would not and would perish. Of course, Nietzsche ignores that it may be
"logical" to presume equality of danger in such circumstances; it is logical to focus on
relevant facts and ignore the irrelevant ones. Id.
199. Id.
200. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 194, at 268.
201. See GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, § 111.
202. See supra notes 98-129 and accompanying text.
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D.
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche examines altruism and lays the
foundation for his later work on ressentiment and bad conscience. 203
Nietzsche sees a fundamental contradiction in altruism.2°4 He attacks the
205idea that altruism is virtuous. To be altruistic, one's actions must be
"selfless," "unegoistic," and detrimental to the person who possesses the
virtue in question, but to Nietzsche, altruism has none of these
qualities.2 6 The contradiction can be viewed from the perspectives of the
giver and the recipient. The giver benefits from altruism, as does the
recipient, the "neighbor. 20 7 Nietzsche stated, "[i]f the neighbor himself
were 'selfless' in his thinking, he would repudiate this diminution of
strength, this mutilation for his benefit; he would work against the
development of such inclinations, and above all he would manifest his
selflessness by not calling it good!
' 20 1
Nietzsche's critique of altruism appears, no doubt coincidentally,
similar to the contemporary economic analysis of altruism. An
economist assumes that people act rationally to maximize their own
utility. Altruism can be a Nash equilibrium strategy when the best
possible strategy that a player X can take is altruistic, given the strategies
that player X expects player Y to take.1 In other words, people will
coordinate around altruism when it makes them better off. Consider a
simple family example. A parent is better off making gifts to his child so
that the child can attend college, when the parent has a preference that
the child attend college. The child is better off too, if her welfare is
increased. Evolutionary biologists make similar findings about non-S • 211
human behavior.
Altruism is an entire research agenda and not susceptible to full
analysis here. I have omitted entirely any mention of research on





208. Id. § 21 (emphasis in original).
209. See Gary S. Becker, Altruism, Egoism and Genetic Fitness: Economics and
Sociobiology, 14 J. ECON. LIT. 817, 818-22 (1976). A substantial amount of economics
literature exists on altruism, but Becker's work pioneered the field. Becker developed a
model in which he showed that even egoists have an incentive to be altruistic when they
benefit from altruism. Although Becker relied on price theory, there is a game theoretical
aspect to all of this.
210. For the fundamentals of game theory, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION (3d ed. 2001).
211. For a layman's explanation, see RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 4-5
(1989).
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altruism in other social sciences, such as in psychology and sociology, and
I have not engaged the philosophical literature on altruism. The point is
that Nietzsche, writing in the nineteenth century, substantially presaged
most of the later research in economics that is so very influential in legal
scholarship.
E.
The origin of cooperation among humans has been the subject of
considerable theorizing by both philosophers and economists 2 2  The
characteristics of cooperation are important in a legal utilitarian calculus
because the law centers on dispute resolving. Understanding the
conditions in which people cooperate can tell us something about the
origin of legal rules. Nietzsche was not interested in learning the
conditions in which people cooperate, but he provides some guidance in
his discussion of the origin of society-preserving morals.
21 3
At the beginning of the Second Essay in On the Genealogy of Morals,
Nietzsche poses the question: "To breed an animal with the right to make
promises-is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the
case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man? 21 4 Nietzsche
then goes on to explain that man's conscience originates in cruelty that
humans have visited upon one another over the years." '  Nietzsche
explained that his second essay was based only on conjecture."'
Anecdotal evidence supports Nietzsche's theory on the medieval origin
217of common law legal rules on the transfer of real property. Though the
212. The literature is vast, but for a start, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION
OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT AXELROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION:
AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION (1997); ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). These sources are rational-choice influenced and influential
in the economics literature.
213. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text
214. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, § 1 (emphasis in original).
215. Id. § 3. Nietzsche says:
Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need
to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges
(sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations
(castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all
religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties)-all this has its origin in the
instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics.
Id.
216. Id. § 6.
217. An important attribute of real property is the ability to transfer it to successive
owners. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 139 (3d ed. 2000).
Transfers require the creation of a record of ownership. Id. In the Middle Ages, few
people could read, and no agencies of government existed as we know them today,
2004]
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livery of seisin terminology has survived into the twentieth century,
records of title held by the appropriate government bodies are the means
by which property transfers are recorded, and the original ceremony is
long forgotten.""
Nietzsche contended that cruelty leads to conscience, which leads to
morality. 9 Social fabric and moral and legal obligation come from
"blood" of passion and not reason: "It was in this sphere then, the sphere
of legal obligations, that the moral conceptual world of 'guilt,'
'conscience,' 'duty' 'sacredness of duty' had its origin: its beginnings
were, like the beginnings of everything great on earth, soaked in blood
thoroughly and for a long time."22 Nietzsche argues that retribution is
the origin of morality:
To ask it again: to what extent can suffering balance debts or
guilt? To the extent that to make suffer was in the highest
degree pleasurable, to the extent that the injured party
exchanged for the loss he had sustained, including the
displeasure caused by the loss, an extraordinary
counterbalancing pleasure: that of making suffer-a genuine
festival, something which, as aforesaid, was prized the more
highly the more violently it contrasted with the rank and social
standing of the creditor.2
He then clarifies the origins of the moral human in the exchange
relationship of debtor-creditor:
[T]he feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin.., in
the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that
between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor; it was here that
one person first encountered another person, that one person
first measured himself against another . . . Setting prices,
determining values, contriving equivalences, exchanging-these
preoccupied the earliest thinking of man to so great an extent
designed to preserve records of title. To record "title" to land, a ceremony known as
"livery of seisin" was conducted in which seller handed the buyer a piece of the turf and a
twig from the land. Id. The folklore on livery of seisin is that the ceremony included the
thrashing of a child who had witnessed the passing of the turf and the twig. Id. The child
was thrashed severely so that he would remember that day forever, thus creating a living
record of the transfer. Id.; see also Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse
Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2440 (2001). I use the words "folklore" and "anecdotal"
because of the debateable historical accuracy of these aspects of the ceremony relating to
the child witness. See S.E. Thorne, Livery of Seisin, 52 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 345
(1956) (not mentioning this aspect of ceremony but discussing the need for observance by
witnesses).
218. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 217.
219. GENEALOGY OF MORALS, supra note 2, Second Essay, § 6 (emphasis in original).
220. Id. (emphasis in original).
221. Id. (emphasis in original).
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that in a certain sense they constitute thinking as such: here it
was that the oldest kind of astuteness developed; here likewise,
we may suppose, did human pride, the feeling of superiority in
222relation to other animals, have its first beginnings.
Thus, humans are valuating, calculating agents similar in nature to the
utility maximizing persons of utilitarianism and law and economics.
Nietzsche's propositions about the origins of morals share similarities
with theorizing economists on why and how people cooperate. These
economists are looking for the incentives that assumedly rational or
boundedly rational humans require in order to engage in contract or
society. Nietzsche was not looking for such a theory, so the comparisons
are imprecise, but his morality discussion tells us something about what
he saw as a relationship among humans, therefore the claims are worthy
of comparison.
The economist Oliver Williamson makes an argument similar to
Nietzsche's argument. Williamson is not looking for the basis or
morality. His limited theory searches for the factors that support
cooperation. His theory is that exchange is based on the idea of taking
hostages. In his article, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to
Support Exchange, Williamson explains that the origins of cooperation
223are in the bargaining exchange over a hostage.
The hostage relationship sets up a relationship similar to Nietzsche's
debtor-creditor relationship. Williamson does not discuss, however, the
224hostage theory anthropologically, or from a natural history viewpoint.
But the connection to Nietzsche's theory seems clear. People engage in
debtor-creditor relationships all the time. If one wants to buy a house,
one becomes a debtor and gives the creditor bank a hostage-a security
interest in one's home. Security interests have their origins in possessory
pledges of property in which the creditor holds the property until the
debt is paid.
Another fruitful comparison is Nietzsche's origins of morals with the
prisoner's dilemma.225 Here, the infliction of tit-for-tat sanctions in an
222. Id. § 8 (emphasis in original).
223. See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 519-20 (1983). Medieval kings guaranteed peace among
themselves by exchanging their children. When a king's child was in the court and country
of his rival, he was less likely to start a war. A good hostage is one that the hostage-giver
values highly and the hostage-taker values little. If the king was to give his rival diamonds,
then deterrence is weak because his rival will place a high value on diamonds, will go to
war, and will keep the diamonds. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 217, at 221.
224. Williamson's approach is consistent with the ahistorical approach of economics as
an "analytical" social science.
225. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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226
infinitely repeating game produces cooperation. Again, the origin of
cooperation lies in a negative sanction. Even Nash equilibrium, a
strategy in game theory in which a player takes the best move he can,
given the move the other player is expected to take, seems to have as its
origins in the measuring and evaluating in the "debtor-creditor"
121relationship that Nietzsche explores.
I have taken some liberties with these theories, and have examined
them in ways that economics does not permit. But the basic point here-
that "sanctions," "prices," or "payoffs" form a base for Nietzsche's
morality as well as for economic analysis-suggest that Nietzsche was not
so far away from law and economics approaches as one would typically
suspect.
F.
Nietzsche's "pitiful" quote, set forth at the beginning of the second
part of the Article, comes from a discussion of poetry in The Gay
Science.228 Nietzsche poses the question whether utilitarianism is an
adequate or complete theory of human behavior, when it cannot account
for something like poetry.229 Here, Nietzsche says he sides with the
utilitarians, in that poetry in ancient times had great utility, to influence
the gods.3 0 The utility in poetry originated in superstition.3  Poetry was
232useful to the ancients. It represents an older form of utilitarianism
designed to impress deities.23' Nietzsche's utilitarian analysis of poetry
can hardly be taken literally. Nietzsche was likely offering a critique of
utilitarianism: try as it may to be scientific and rational, its origins are
primordial, in superstition, in the approach of ancient rhyme whose
rhythm is intended to serve as supernatural.
In Book Three of The Gay Science, Nietzsche sets forth the core of his
epistemological thinking. Although this part of The Gay Science says
very little about utilitarianism, it offers a powerful examination of the
concepts of science and explanation, relevant for reflecting on
methodologies used in legal scholarship.235
226. Id. at 27.
227. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, HUMAN ALL Too HUMAN § 92 (Walter Kaufmann
trans., 1966).
228. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.






235. Id. §§ 167-220.
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Explanation is impossible, according to Nietzsche."' Nietzsche
contended that we are better at describing states of affairs, but we are no
better at explaining them than we were in pre-modern times.237 Nietzsche
was ahead of his time in his critique of scientific explanation. "How
should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into
an image, our image!""" As for cause and effect, "in truth we are
confronted by a continuum out of which we isolate a couple of pieces
.,,239 Here, Nietzsche presages much of the postmodern attack on the
use of scientific method in the social sciences, including the problem of
false consciousness, and the weaknesses of empiricism in the social
sciences, in which we try to isolate phenomena and control for others in
order to develop the idea of statistical inference and probabilistic
analysis.
To put Nietzsche in the proper perspective, his criticism of science was
not of science per se, and particularly not of the natural sciences.
Nineteenth-century continental Europeans had a far broader notion of
science than do twentieth-century Americans. Nietzsche's critique of
science centered on the blind application of the scientific method to
social phenomena and art. The Germans, for example, conceptualized
law as a science in the nineteenth-century, and the idea that law is a
science still clings in the official version of German law, in the German
legal academy, in the courts, and among legal practitioners trained in the
academy.240 In the juridical science of continental jurists, determining
what is the appropriate legal rule is a scientific enterprise, the product of
reason; the contents of legal rules can be determined autonomously as a
scientific endeavor. 4 ' German juridical science (or French for that
matter) is not mathematical, but systematic. Economic analysis of law
tends towards the mathematical but often is not, and a significant
economically influenced legal scholarship exists, which uses economics as
a kind of utilitarian moral philosophy to inquire about the effects of
242
law.
Nietzsche was an early critic of such approaches as a kind of scientism.
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche used the word "faith" to describe scientific
236. Id. § 172.
237. See id.
238. Id. § 112 (emphasis in original).
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., John Linarelli, Anglo-American Jurisprudence and Latin America, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 50,67 (1996).
241. Id.
242. See generally David A. Hoffman & Michael P. O'Shea, Can Law and Economics
Be Both Practical and Principled?, 53 ALA. L. REV. 335 (2002).
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method.2 3 In science, theories are always subject to revision through
hypothesis testing and falsification. But such theories, in Nietzsche's
philosophy, are subject to prior convictions, things a priori and necessary
for the scientific method to exist as a discipline. Science does not exist
without presuppositions. The particular presupposition required is that
truth is needed and more important than everything else.244 Science rests
on a faith in truth.14' He is critical of faith in "a 'world of truth' that can
be mastered completely and forever with the aid of our square little
reason."2 46 Nietzsche says:
What? Do we really want to permit existence to be degraded
for us like this-reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and
an indoor diversion for mathematicians? Above all, one should
not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity: that is a dictate
of good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence for everything
247that lies beyond your horizon.
To Nietzsche, scientific method inquires about only "the most superficial
and external aspect of existence-what is most apparent, its skin and
sensualization .... ,248 Such a scientific interpretation of the world might
be "one of the most stupid of all possible interpretations of the world," in
other words, "the poorest in meaning. ', 24 Nietzsche's concern was that if
we subjected the social world or art to the scientific method, we would




The first essay in Beyond Good and Evil is entitled "On the Prejudices
of Philosophers., 251 It sets forth several ideas of relevance here. Early in
the essay, Nietzsche questions analytical and systematic methods.
Nietzsche was passionate in his dislike of German systematic reasoning.
252
These methods reflect what Nietzsche elsewhere calls the bad
conscience. On the surface, the scholar's work is articulated and
presented as a process of disinterested discovery, "self-development of a
cold, pure, divinely unconcerned dialectic. 25 3 The reality is that it is not
analytical. "[It is an assumption, a hunch, indeed a kind of
243. GAY SCIENCE, supra note 3, §§ 344, 373.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 344.
246. Id.
247. Id. (emphasis in original).
248. Id.
249. Id. (emphasis in original).
250. Id.
251. BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, §§ 1-23.
252. Id. § 11.
253. Id. § 5.
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'inspiration'-most often a desire of the heart that has been filtered and
made abstract-that they defend with reasons they have sought after the
fact., 25 4  Analysis is a way to mask prejudice. 2" Logicians have
superstitions, logic is therefore superstitious. Narrative is more
important than method; philosophy is the "personal confession of its
author and a kind of involuntary or unconscious memoir.
In the essay entitled "Natural History of Morals" in Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche continues his attack on reason.2 ' Reason cannot explain
what is good. It is instrumental; reason serves good. Nietzsche criticizes
morality as irrational, what Christianity calls faith, Nietzsche deems
"herd" instinct.219 Authority does not concede to reason; it is the other
way around.2 °
Nietzsche continues his critique of reason and science in his essay "We
Scholars" in Beyond Good and Evil."' Here he asserts the importance of
experience over reason, and emphasizes that philosophy cannot be
262taught, because one must know it from experience. Nietzsche's
metaphor is that philosophy, or, to generalize, learnedness, without
263experience is like a blind man examining colors. In response to
254. Id. § 5; see Hal R. Varian, How to Build an Economic Model in Your Spare Time,
in PASSION AND CRAFT: ECONOMISTS AT WORK (Michael Szenberg ed., Univ. of
Michigan Press 1997) (copy on file with author). In advising economics graduate students
on how to develop an economic model, Varian explains:
I think that you should look for your ideas outside the academic journals-in
newspapers, in magazines, in conversations, and in TV and radio programs.
When you read the newspaper, look for the articles about economics ... and
then look at the ones that aren't about economics, because lots of the time they
end up being about economics too. Magazines are usually better than
newspapers because they go into issues in more depth. On the other hand, a
shallower analysis may be more stimulating: there's nothing like a fallacious
argument to stimulate research. Conversations, especially with people in
business, are often very fruitful. Commerce is conducted in many ways, and most
of them have never been subjected to a serious economic analysis. Of course you
have to be careful not to believe everything you hear-people in business usually
know a set of rules that work well for running their own business, but they often
have no idea of where these rules come from or why they work, and this is really
what economists tend to find interesting. In many cases your ideas can come
from your own life and experiences.
Id.
255. See BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, § 5, at 12-13.
256. Id. § 17, at 24.
257. Id. § 6, at 13.
258. See generally id. pt. 5.
259. See supra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
260. See BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 166, § 191, at 103-04.
261. See generally id. pt. 6.
262. Id. §§ 204, 213, at 121, 139.
263. See id. § 204, at 121.
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utilitarian criticisms of philosophy as dealing with questions that cannot
be answered and that were not worth answering, Nietzsche referred to
the "color blindness of the utility man who sees nothing in philosophy
but a series of refuted systems and a prodigal effort that 'does nobody
any good."' 264
CONCLUSION
Nietzsche remains a mysterious and misunderstood figure in legal
philosophy. His intractability to legal theorists is undoubtedly the result
of his acerbic prose, his iconoclasm, and his heaping of scorn on Socrates,
Christianity, Judaism, Enlightenment, democracy, socialism, women and
their emancipation, the notion of human equality fundamental to
liberalism, and just about everything else associated with modernity.265
His ethical principles and his insights on the human condition make him
an important philosopher worthy of study by legal theorists. Nietzsche
provides an ethical and critical perspective about science and reason that
offers a great deal to assist us in understanding how to theorize and
engage in interdisciplinary inquiries about law.' 66 What Nietzsche said
about classical studies is relevant to our thinking about him in the
context of legal theory: "I do not know what meaning classical studies
could have for our time if they were not untimely-that is to say, acting
counter to our time and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for
the benefit of a time to come.,
267
264. Id. at 122 (emphasis in original).
265. See Berkowitz, supra note 7, at 1.
266. See generally Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for
Life, in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS (R.J. Hollingdale trans.,
1997).
267. Id. at 60.
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